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STUDENT NOTE
MORAL OBLIGATION-WHO SHALL BE THE KEEPER OF THE STATE'S

CONSCIENCE?-The troublesome problem of moral obligation-Le.,

the policy that the state, notwithstanding its immunity from suit,' is
morally bound under certain circumstances to compensate injured
claimants-has recently ,become of increasing interest and importance in West Virginia. Specifically narrowed down, the interest
xevolves around the weight that the court should give a legislative
enactment indicating that certain facts constitute moral obligation,
thereby validating payment of public funds to satisfy the injured
party. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has faced
this delicate question several times of late upon the refusal of the
state auditor to issue his warrant in compliance with a legislative
enactment. In 1947, the court held for the first timeO that a legislative determination that certain facts constitute a moral obligation
was not condusive. 3 In rapid succession, this holding was cited
1 W. VA. CONsT. Art. VI, §35, "The state of West Virginia shall never be
made defendant in any court of law or equity, except the state of West Virginia,
including any subdivision thereof, or any municipality therein, or any officer,
agent, or employee thereof, may be made defendant in any garnishment or
attachment proceeding, as garnishee or suggestee."
2 In a prior case, State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 430, 43 S. E.2d
805 (1947), the court refused to honor an award of the legislature, declaring
that the finding of the existence of a moral obligation based upon facts which
give rise to a juristic condition is subject to investigation and consideration
by the court. But the language was not at all explicit.
3 State ex rel. Adkins v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 646, 46 S. E.2d 81 (1947). Six
youths were killed when their automobile crashed over a precipitous bank.
There were no survivors and no witnesses to the accident. The administrators
of each of these six decedents filed a claim with the state Court of Claims for
$10,000 based on the state's alleged negligence in not havingproper warning signs
at the curve. The Court of Claims awarded the admisiistrators of each $3,500,
and admitted negligence on the part of the state. The legislature accepted
this recommendation during the 1945 session, and appropriated the money to
satisfy the award. The state auditor refused to honor the appropriation on
the basis that it was the payment of public funds for a private purpose. When
the administrators sought writs of mandamus, the court denied issuance because
the legislature had failed to state with the appropriation that the reason for
the award was moral obligation. The legislature in the 1947 session affirmed
and approved the appropriation of the 1945 session, and further declared that, as
a finding of fact, the circumstances resulting in the award constituted a moral
obligation of the state. The state auditor still refused to honor the award on
the same grounds. Again the administrators sought mandamus. Again the
writ of mandamus was denied, the court squarely, decisively and expressly
holding that the existence of moral obligation is a judicial question, and that
a legislative declaration, while entitled to respect, is not binding on the court.
The court reasoned that the state road commission could not mark every curve
in the state, and that the proper exercise of this discretion did not constitute
negligence.
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with approval, and followed both in upholding4 and in avoidingr
legislative appropriations. The court has carefully pointed out
that these holdings should not be construed to mean that the
judiciary has the power to recognize moral obligation, or that the
court will substitute its ideas of good public policy for those of
the legislature.6 Rather, the legislature may recognize what it
deems to be a moral obligation; but, once the legislature has
decided moral obligation exists, then the judiciary has the power
to review determinations of facts to see if the basis for moral obligation did, as a matter of law, exist.
Why the payment by the state of public funds for such purposes should be so closely guarded by the courts arises from the
settled rule that public money shall not be paid for private purposes.7 However, the West Virginia court follows the almost
universal rule that the payment of public monies for a moral
obligation, 'even if to a private individual, is a public expenditure,
and therefore within the power of the legislature.8 Since moral
obligation is based on equitable and honorable obligations rather
than positive rules of law, the courts have refused to question the
legislature's determination of the facts resulting in the appropriation unless such determination was clearly erroneous. 9 That the
courts have usually refused to question the legislative conclusion
from the facts as well is due to a reluctance to invade the province
4 State ex rel. Davis Trust Co. v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 623, 46 S. E.2d 90 (1947).
Prison guard was negligent in permitting a known dangerous criminal to escape
resulting in the immediate rape and murder of an elderly lady.
5 State ex rel. Bennett v. Sims, 48 S. E.2d 13 (W. Va. 1948). Experienced
state employee was unexplainably injured while handling dynamite; tested
by rules which would have been applicable had the litigation been between
private parties, the court could find no fault on the state's part.
0 State ex rel. Davis Trust Co. v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 623, 637, 46 S. E.2d 90, 97
(1947).
7 "The law is too well settled to require an extended argument to the
effect that the Legislature can levy taxes and appropriate public revenues, only
for public purposes." Woodall v. Darst, 71 W.Va. 350, 354, 77 S. E. 264, 265 (1912).
"It is implied in all definitions of taxation that taxes can be levied for public
purposes only and the rule that taxes can be levied only for public purposes
is so well settled that a lengthy citation of decisions so holding is unnecessary."
I COOLEY, TAXATION §174 (4th ed. 1924 Nichols).
8 Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S. E. 264 (1912); United States v.
Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427 (1896); Fairfield v. Huntington, 23 Ariz. 528, 205
Pac. 814 (1922); Munro v. State, 223 N. Y. 208, 119 N. E. 444 (1919); Wyoming
ex rel. McPherren v. Carter, 30 Wyo. 22, 215 Pac. 477 (1923).
9 E.g., United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427 (1896); Payne v. Jones,
47 S. D. 488, 199 N. W. 472 (1924); Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S. E.
264 (1912); 42 AM. Jux., Public Funds §57 (1942).
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of the legislature, and from the judicial inability to promulgate a
concrete definition able to withstand an objective test. A moral
obligation need not be such as would give rise to a cause of action
against a private party; as usually expressed by the courts, the
requirements are that an obligation must exist which would be
recognized by a man with a keen sense of honor and with a real
desire to act fairly and equitably without compulsion of law.10
These indicia, however, have been formulated as the courts
were refusing to invade what they considered the all but exclusive
province of the legislature. Our own decisions have never followed
this classic concept. In 1912, when the doctrine of moral obligation was first expressly recognized in West Virginia," the Supreme
Court of Appeals observed by obiter dictum that whether a legislative appropriation was for a public or a private purpose was a
question finally determinable by the court.'0 In 1934, the court
stated (although not in considering the doctrine of moral obligation) that "a legislative declaration in respect of an existing condition as of fact but actually juristical, is not conclusive."' 13 Even
with these signposts, the results reached in recent moral obligation
cases appear to be startling infringements on legislative powers
in view of the traditionally accepted broad rules laid down in
regard to the legislature's determination of facts prior to and as a
basis for an enactment; indeed, our own court, in decisions concerning legislation, has chronologically stated that the judiciary
cannot inquire into the motives and necessities which may. have
superinduced the passage of an act'--that a fact once determined
by the legislature, and made the basis for an act, is not thereafter
open to judicial investigation'--and that a legislative declaration
of fact should be accepted by the courts unless there is strong reason
for rejecting it.16 Such statements, moreover, are consistent with
10 E.g., Fairfield v. Huntington, 23 Ariz. 528, 205 Pac. 814 (1922); Hagler v.
Small, 307 Ill. 460, 138 N. E. 849 (1923); People v. Westchester County National
Bank, 231 N. Y. 465, 132 N. E. 241 (1921); Ausable Chasm Co. v. State, 266 N. Y.
326, 194 N. E. 843 (1935).
11 Semble Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612 (1875). This case had no discussion
of the doctrine of moral obligation, although the facts would have warranted it.
12 Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, 359, 77 S. E. 264, 267 (1912).
13 See Berry v. Fox, 114 W. Va. 513, 523, 172 S. E. 896, 901 (1934).
14 Slack v. Jacob, 8 W. Va. 612, 637 (1875).
1 Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, 359, 77 S. E. 264, 267 (1912).
10 Glover v. Sims, 121 W. Va. 407, 409, 3 S.E.2d, 612, 613 (1939).
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those in other jurisdictions. 7 That the court should presume any
legislative enactment valid, and that it should not declare legislative acts unconstitutional if under any set of facts they may be upheld, are axioms of constitutional law; an overwhelming number of
decisions hold that, if certain facts would make an act constitutional, the court will not make a separate investigation of the
facts, and will not attempt to decide whether the legislature has
xeached a correct conclusion with respect to them. s It is felt that
to do so would be substituting the wisdom of the court for that
of the legislature. Particularly would this reasoning seem to be
applicable in moral obligation, which depends by its very nature
not upon positive rules of law, but rather on the conscience of the
arbiters.
In the decisions of the past three years, however, the holdings
of the West Virginia court are apparently in disregard of such
constitutional law principles. In State ex rel. Davis Trust Co. v.
Sims, 19 the court upheld a legislative award to the administrators
of decedent: she had died at the hands of a convict from the state
security farm at Huttonsville, a convicted murderer and a known
sexual pervert who was allowed by the guards to roam at will, when
that convict "unaccompanied and unobserved, left the prison, went
to the [decedent's] farm.... and there, after raping her, murdered
her with a knife"; the decision was based on the guard's negligence,
and the general rules of agency. In State ex rel. Bennett v. Simsft
the court reversed a legislative award based on the doctrine of
17 Courts will generally acquiesce in the legislative determination of facts
unless it is clearly erroneous, arbitrary, or wholly unwarranted. E.g., Ex parte

Spencer, 146 Cal. 396, 86 Pac. 896 (1906); McSween v. State Live Stock Sanitary

Board of Florida, 97 Fla. 750, 122 So. 239 (1929); Smith v. Command, 231 Mich.
409, 204 N. W. 140 (1925); State ex rel. Linde v. Packard, 35 N. D. 298, 160

N. W. 150 (1916); Stettler v. O'Hara, 69 Ore. 519, 139 Pac. 743 (1914); Poulnot

v. Cantwell, 129 S. C. 171, 123 S. E. 651 (1924).
Determination of what constitutes public burden and what is for public
good are questions for the legislature, with which the courts are loath to

interfere. Stanley v. Jeffries, 86 Mont. 114, 133, 234 Pac. 135, 139 (1929).
Courts are said to have no power to conduct an investigation of facts

which may enter into a question of public policy or expediency to sustain or

frustrate legislation according to whether the courts happen to approve or
disapprove the determination of such questions of fact by the legislature.
E.g., Consumers' League v. Colorado & S. Ry., 53 Colo. 54, 125 Pac. 577 (1912);
Sanders v. Commonwealth 117 Ky. 1, 77 S. W. 358 (1903); Ex pare Kair, 28
Nev. 127, 80 Pac. 463 (1905).
18 16 C. J. S., Constitutional Law §151c (1939).
'9 130 W. Va. 623, 46 S. E.2d 90 (1947).
0O48 S. E.2d 13 (W. Va. 1948).
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res ipsa loquitur because "the relator has not established such negligence on the part of the Road Commission as would establish his
to recover damages for his injuries, if, on the same state of facts, this
were an action between private litigants." The result of State ex
iel. Adkins v. Sims2' obtained from similar reasoning. All three
of these cases are based on the decision in State ex rel. Cashman v.
Sims,22 perhaps the most positive curtailment of legislative finality
and authority, and certainly the initial blow. In this case, the
relator was a doctor employed at a tuberculosis sanitarium which
was an agency of the state. The low salaries offered by the state
had resulted in a shortage of nurses, and the entire staff was overworked.2u The relator had been examined for tuberculosis prior
to starting his term of employment, and no evidence of this disease
had been found. During his employment, he contracted tuberculosis, and was forced to discontinue his work and to receive treatnients for the disease. The Court of Claims awarded'him $2,000
because of the failure of the state to provide adequate conditions
of employment. The state auditor refused to issue his warrant as
directed by the legislature; a writ of mandamus was sought. The
supreme court denied the writ on the basis that tuberculosis was
not at that time considered an occupational disease, and that no
definite proof was advanced showing that either employment or
the admitted lack of facilities caused the illness, and that, since a
private employer would not have been legally responsible, the
payment by the state would have been an unconstitutional gift.
Obviously, a fair and just man might consider himself responsible
under such conditions, and under a moral obligation to repay the
injured party. The court could quite easily have found sufficient
facts present to uphold the legislative decision and the resulting
appropriation.
Therefore, these cases must stand for the principle that moral
01 State ex rel. Adkins v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 646, 46 S. E.2d 81 (1947).
22 130 W. Va. 430, 43 S. E.2d 805 (1947).
-3 To more fully understand the significance of the holding it is interesting
to note statements of the Court of Claims' findings in the court's opinion. These
findings were not disrupted, the court merely saying moral obligation did not
exist. Testimony before the Court of Claims hearing showed that more nurses
were needed; current medical standards required a larger staff of doctors and
not less than 32 nurses to care for 80 patients. At Hopemont, the relator with
the aid of only three nurses, was required to attend the 80 patients. A survey
of experts showed that an annual minimum sum of $270,000 in salaries would
have been necessary to care for the salaries of the institution if adequately
staffed; sum available for that purpose was only $192,000.
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obligation is a judicial question in nature, and that the legislature's determination is merely directive: should the legislature and
judiciary disagree, the court's decision is, and should be, final. 4
To say that moral obligation is a judicial question deprives the
legislature of its fundamental right to determine what is most
desirable for the public. True, if the legislature had power to act
only in certain contingencies, the court may look to see if such
contingency exists.2 Since the payment of public funds is prohibited for purely private purposes, the legislative action is valid
only if moral obligation does exist. The traditional system of
checks and balances demands that, if a legislative enactment is
clearly a gift, the court must have the right to strike it down;
otherwise, a benevolent or imprudent legislature could deplete the
public funds by grants of charity and outright gifts. Such reasoning brings us face to face with the real question involved: to what
degree must the legislative enactment be presumed valid in moral
obligation cases? Should the court apply the usual test for legislation: that, unless clearly erroneous, enactments must be upheld?
Should the test be different in moral obligation cases, for example,
than the test applied in ordinary due process cases, so that the
public treasury will be protected with greater diligence than the
property and rights of the citizens? Must the legislature be presumed to be more apt to err in making payments of claims than it
is in passing other public acts? That moral obligation is intangible
and abstract, and frequently denotes different standards to different people, is not a valid reason to apply a stricter policy for it
than for more tangible doctrines.
Our West Virginia court, however, seems to be applying this
stricter policy in spite of the overwhelming weight of authority to
the contrary. 2 Inasmuch as appropriations for moral obligations
are within the inherent power of the legislature, it is felt that, when
v4 Such a ruling places West Virginia in a peculiar position: the judiciary
can not originally recognize moral obligations; the legislature, which may, can
not finally assert this power if the state auditor objects; and without a cautious
auditor, the judiciary could never pass judgment at all. But, with the court's
increasing inclination to exercise its discretion, more work results for an already
overburdened court, since, with the legislature's determination not final, the
state auditor will inevitably feel more inclined to deny payment of awards,
with the result that claimants will have to seek mandamus to enforce the claim.
25 Zimmerman v. Brooks, 118 Ky. 85, 80 S. W. 443 (1904). 28 Ky. L. J.
495 (1941).
20 See note 9 supra.
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the law making body exercises its discretion, its action should be
held in the same high regard as other legislative acts. The United
States Supreme Court, for example, recognizes that the legislature
has the power to determine whether claims upon the public treasury are founded upon principles of right and justice, and that,
once the legislature has decided the question in the affirmative,
and has appropriated public money for payment of such claims,
its decision can rarely if ever be the subject of review by the judicial
branch of the government.2 7 Even New York, which probably
comes the closest to the West Virginia view, 25 permits court review
only to see if the elements of moral obligation are present. 29 Our
court continues to cite West Virginia holdings that legislative
actions are entitled to the greatest respect and not to be overthrown
by the judiciary unless clearly wrong; 30 but the decisions have not
followed the spirit of the earlier opinions. Our court attempts to
make a distinction between enactments based on moral obligation
and other legislative acts on the basis that the existence of moral
obligation is a juristic condition. But is not the factual situation
behind any legislation equally as juristic a condition? The
Supreme Court of Appeals has attempted to lay down a general
rule to guide the legislature: a moral obligation does not exist
unless (1) when, save for the constitutional immunity of the state
krom suit, there exists a contractual obligation, not created or
27 United States v. Realty Co., 163 U. S. 427 (1896).

28 State ex rel. Adkins v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 646, 46 S. E.2d 81 (1947) where
the court expressly held that the existence of moral obligation is a judicial
question, and that a legislative declaration, while entitled to respect, is not
binding on the court.
20 While there is a dearth of decisions on this precise point-legislative
determination that moral obligation exists is not conclusive-West Virginia
has some authority in their line of reasoning. See Williamsburg Savings Bank
v. State, 243 N. Y. 231, 241, 153 N. E. 58, 61 (1926), in which it was stated,
"the decision by the legislature that certain facts create a moral obligation,
even if those facts exist, is not conclusive." (Legislative determination upheld).
See Farrington v. State, 248 N. Y. 112, 115, 161 N. E. 438, 440 (1928), where
the court said, "it must appear to the judicial mind and conscience that the
particular claim belongs to a class concerning which the legislature might
reasonably say is founded in equity and justice and invokes a moral obligation;
otherwise such enactment is an unconstitutional exercise of the legislative
power." (Legislative determination upheld). In Ausable Chasm Co. v. State, 266
N. Y. 326, 330, 194 N. E. 843, 845 (1935), the court stated that "to establish a
claim founded upon a moral obligation the court must find that moral obligation
actually exists." (Legislative award not upheld). In Hines v. State, 234 N. Y.
Supp. 224, 225 (1929) the court declared that it was settled law in New York
that the legislature might recognize moral obligation but such finding not
conclusive and that the courts were not thereby precluded from deciding
whether the judgment (sic) of the legislature was correct.
30 State ex rel. Bennett v. Sims, 48 S. E.2d 13, 16 (W. Va. 1948).
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authorized by prior statute, of such a nature that in cases between
private persons it would be recognized and considered as valid and
binding, either at law or in equity, or (2) when a right to compensation is created in favor of a claimant by a previously enacted
statute, and injury or damage results to him without fault on his
part while he is engaged in the discharge of a lawfully imposed
duty.3' The court itself realized that such restrictions upon moral
obligation were too strict; and, therefore, it went on to state that
situations might arise, as exceptions to the general rule laid down,
in which moral obligations might properly be found to exist which
were predicated upon simple justice such as a fair and just man
should assume in his own affairs, even though he was not compelled by law to do so." While verbally recognizing the moral
nature of some claims, however, the court has refused some extremely persuasive fact situations in basing their opinions in all
cases solely on the theory that, if no liability would have existed
between private parties, then the declaration by the legislature 3
that moral obligation existed was invalid.3 4 The inescapable conclusion is that the appropriations of the legislature are reflections
31 State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 430, 442, 43 S. E.2d 805, 814

(1947).
32

Ibid.

33 As to the position that the Court of Claims assumes in -aiding the

legislative determination, it should be remembered that the Court of Claims
has only the capacity of a legislative committee. In 1941, to assist the legislature
to arrive correctly at the proper decision, and to provide an expeditious consideration of claims against the state, the State Court of Claims was created.
W. VA. CODE c. 14, art. 2, §1 (Michie, 1943). The function of this three-judgc
court is to hear claims as a special instrumentality of the legislature; it is not
invested with judicial power of the state. W. VA. CODE C. 14, art. 2, §4
(Michie, 1943). A determination of the Court of Claims is not subject to
appeal or review by a court of law: the findings of the Court of Claiths may
be adopted or rejected by the legislature as its own determination of such facts
without independent investigation, for the powers and duties of the Court of
Claims are legislative in character. State ex. rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va.
430, 436, 43 S. E.2d 805, 811 (1947). This court has no power to issue an award
itself; it may only recommend action to the legislature; the legislature, in
approving this recommendation is granting its own award. Having no power
in itself, the Court of Claims is only a step in the procedure of making a
claim against the state. It serves to "weed out" unworthy claims, and thereby
saves the legislature valuable time, while assuring the claimants that their
claims have received thorough examination. If the legislature makes an
award on the basis of a Court of Claims recommendation, the judiciary role
in West Virginia commences only if the state auditor contests the award.
34 The supreme court has expressly applied legal liability test between
private persons in: State ex rel. Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 430, 43 S.E.2d 805
(1947); State ex rel. Davis Trust Co. v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 623, 46 S. E.2d 90
(1947); State ex rel. Adkins v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 646, 46 S.E.2d 81 (1947); State
ex rel. Bennett v. Sims, 48 S.E.2d 13 (W. Va. 1948).
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of judicial rather than legislative discretion; for, whether the court
intends to restrict moral obligations to claims that would entitle
the relator to relief against a private party, or whether the exceptions to the general test must spring only from the court's conscience,
the result is the some: in cases of moral obligation in West Virginia,
the legislature (after originally instituting the action) stands on no
higher a level than a lower court in an ordinary action or suit, or
than an administrative agency in its hearings of proceedings.

P.

J. F.

CASE COMMENTS
FEDERAL

APPELLATE

PROCEDURE-CERTIORARI-CONSIDERATION

OF CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS NOT PRESERVED ON THE RECORD

Petitioner was convicted of disorderly conduct for violating a
Chicago ordinance concerning which the trial judge gave an instruction abridging the right of freedom of speech, to which petitioner
did not except. The ground on which he based his appeal to the
state appellate courts was that the ordinance as applied to his conduct violated his right of freedom of speech. Following affirmance
in the appellate and supreme courts of Illinois, Chicago v. Terminiello, 332 Ill. App. 17, 74 N. E.2d 45 (1947); 400 Ill. 23, 79 N.
E.2d 39 (1949), the case went on certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court without specification of the erroneous instruction
as ground for review in the application for the writ. Held, reversed.
The ordinance as construed being unconstitutional, the fact that
petitioner did not except to nor contest the instruction left it none
the less ripe for review by the Supreme Court. Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U. S. 1 (1949) (5-4 decision).
The majority opinion relies on Stromberg v. California, 283
U. S. 359 (1931). Although the Stromberg case substantially upholds the decision in the principal case, a distinction exists, however significant, which would have permitted an opposite result
in the principal case under available authority. In the Stromberg
case the trial court instructed, following the express terms of the
statute, that appellant could be convicted if her conduct.fell within
any of the purposes set forth therein. There was a general verdict
of guilty. Appellant did not except to the instruction but, on
appeal to the state appellate court, contended that one of the proscriptions of the statute was invalid under the Fourteenth Amend-
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